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AbStrACt
Within the last two decades, local authorities throughout Germany have 
increased their revenue by stepping up their economic activities. Municipal 
business ventures range from energy supply to catering services and even food 
retail, and are almost all justified by some public purpose or other. In 2010, 
local authorities in western Germany earned 5.3 pc of total revenue from their 
economic activities, compared to 4.7 pc in 1992. The share in eastern Germany 
was rising over the same period from 4.3 pc to 5.1 pc. In fact in 2010 a total of 
€ 9.3 billion was earned by local authorities this way (compared to € 6.0 billion 
in 1992). The aim of the paper is to examine this trend from the perspective of 
public finance by drawing on the theory of public goods, the theory of fiscal 
federalism and some aspects of new political economy. Although the results 
vary somewhat depending on the angle taken, on balance the new economic 
activities by local government in Germany must be assessed negatively.
Key words: local public finance, publicly provided goods, local public enterprises, 
fiscal federalism, new political economy
JEL: H42, H71, L32
1 Introduction
Hardship breeds creativity: In times of budget deficits – as most of the 
local authorities in Germany have experienced during the last 20 years – 
municipalities increasingly come up with new commercial ideas in an attempt 
to generate more revenue. Councils no longer stop at supplying electricity, 
gas and water or collecting garbage all of which are traditional local public 
economic activities. They have also begun to offer various other goods 
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and services through publicly owned businesses. These economic activities 
include transport, IT and telecom services. Some local authorities own gravel 
pits, quarries and vineyards. Others run catering services, flowers shops, 
restaurants and hotels, travel agencies, energy consultancies, fingernail 
studios or even car washes. Still other councils take on the repair of private 
vehicles at their local transport services centers (Meyer & Scholl 1999; Fuest 
et al., 2002; Döring 2003a; Bardt & Fuest 2007).
The aforementioned examples of new economic activities of German local 
authorities in order to conquer existing budget deficits are by no means 
exceptions; in fact within the last two decades local authorities throughout 
Germany have increased their entrepreneurial activities more than ever 
before. In 2010 5.3 pc of local authorities’ revenue in western Germany came 
from their own business activities, up from 4.7 pc in 1992; in eastern Germany 
in the same period the share rose from 4.3 pc to 5.1 pc. The business income 
reported here comprises the sale of electricity, gas, water, and agricultural 
and forestry products, renting and leasing, and profits from economic 
enterprises and company shareholding, as well as license taxes and concession 
levies. In all, in 2010 commercial earnings contributed almost € 9.3 billion to 
local government budget, which represents an increase of more than 50 pc 
compared to € 6.0 billion in 1992 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2011). Considering 
the last decade (1999–2010), Table 1 shows from a regional perspective the 
development of local public revenues deriving from economic activities.
Table 1: Local public revenues from economic activities on a regional level 
(in million Euro – change in percentage points)
German Federal States 1999 2010 Δ 1999–2010
Baden-Württemberg 1,520 1,496 –1.57
Bavaria 1,323 1,844 +39.38
Brandenburg 216 242 +12.04
Hesse 650 674 +3.69
Lower Saxony 633 791 +24.96
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 196 210 +7.14
North Rhine-Westphalia 1,847 2,129 +13.24
Rhineland-Palatinate 382 511 +33.77
Saarland 76 73 –3.94
Saxony 392 450 +14.79
Saxony-Anhalt 211 330 +56.39
Schleswig Holstein 240 277 +15.41
Thuringia 213 243 +14.08
West Germany 6,671 7,799 +16.91
East Germany 1,228 1,477 +20.27
Total 7,899 9,276 +17.43
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2011); own calculations
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As can be seen from Table 1, the quantity of economic activities of local 
authorities – indicated by revenues stemming from these activities – did 
increase from 1999 up to 2010 by a two-digit growth rate: In Germany on 
the whole, local economic activities did expand about 17.43 pc. Only the local 
authorities in Baden-Württemberg (–1.57 pc) as well as Saarland (–3.94 pc) 
had to face decreasing revenues concerning their economic activities within 
the time period under consideration. The most extensive growth of business 
activities of local authorities took place in Saxony-Anhalt; the related revenues 
increase by 56.39 pc, followed up by the cities and municipalities in Bavaria 
(+39.38 pc) and the Rhineland-Palatinate (+33.77 pc). Altogether, from 
1999 up to 2010 the biggest extension of local public economic activities 
is reported for eastern Germany (20.27 pc), whereas the revenues of local 
authorities in western Germany stemming from business activities did only 
increase by 16.91 pc within the same time period. In both cases, cities and 
municipalities did expand their commercial activities in account of the private 
economic sector.
There are many reasons for this commercial expansion, one being the altered 
economic environment. For instance, in European Union the competition 
policy of the last two decades has resulted in the effect that traditional 
(usually monopolized) areas of business of municipal companies in Germany 
are coming under growing pressure from private competition (European 
Commission, 1996 and 2000; Hrbek & Nettesheim, 2002). Therefore, 
with revenues in these areas falling, tackling new fields of business is now 
regarded by local government as a way of compensating for the loss of 
income. In general it is seen as a way of earning additional revenue for 
local public budgets and hence indirectly helping local councils meet their 
responsibilities. Ultimately, expanding commercial activity is also envisaged 
as a way of safeguarding public jobs under threat as the turnover of existing 
municipal companies shrinks.
Yet this expansion strategy has encountered sharp criticism, and its economic 
impact has become the subject of lively debate in Germany (Otting, 1997a; 
Fuest et al., 2002; Döring, 2003a; Bardt & Fuest 2007; Scherf, 2010; focusing 
local public banks Döring, 2003b). Economic activities by local government 
are mainly censured by private companies and business associations, who are 
critical of the unequal conditions for the competition between private and 
local public enterprise claiming that commercial activities by local authorities 
should be restricted. Against this background, the paper examines the 
problem from various perspectives. In the first step, attention is focused 
below on the existing legal limitations currently imposed on local public 
economic activities in Germany (chapter 2). Furthermore, the described trend 
is analyzed from a public finance perspective by drawing on the theory of 
public goods (chapter 3), the theory of fiscal federalism (chapter 4) and some 
aspects of new political economy (chapter 5).
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2 Legal restrictions on local public economic activities
The present legal framework places restrictions on the economic activities of 
local authorities in Germany. The German Constitution does not disallow the 
broadening of local public economic activities in principal, but regional laws 
(passed by the German federal states) regulate the legality of these activities 
in the charters which govern the local institutional setup (so called municipal 
ordinances). Although these vary somewhat between the German states, in 
the majority of them economic activities by local authorities are permitted if 
(Kuntze, 2002):
•	 The	activity	is	justified	by	a	public	purpose.
•	 The	 type	 and	 extend	 of	 the	 activity	 correspond	 with	 the	 financial	
capacity of the local authority and the prospective need for the public 
service.
•	 The	purpose	cannot	be	fulfilled	more	or	even	equally	effectively	by	the	
private sector (the so called subsidiary clause).
•	 In addition, Art. 28 Sect. 2 of the German constitution rules that a local 
authority may only undertake economic activities locally.
With	respect	to	the	aforementioned	legal	requirements,	the	»public	purpose«	
item is the crucial limiting criterion regarding the commercial behavior of local 
government. Following a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court, however, 
it is up to local political representatives to decide independently whether a 
public	 purpose	 exists.	 Consequently,	 the	 legal	 restrictions	 placed	 on	 local	
public economic activities are in reality rather weak. General consensus is 
limited to the view that a public purpose does not exist if the public enterprise 
solely	serves	fiscal	objectives.	The	»financial	capacity«	criterion	is	meant	that	
a	local	authority	must	be	able	to	cope	with	fiscal	losses	in	case	a	local	public	
enterprise	is	running	a	deficit.
The	third	criterion,	the	»subsidiarity	clause«,	is	not	contained	in	all	municipal	
ordinances. Even where subsidiarity clauses are included, they vary in 
meaning. In some cases the clause may imply that local public enterprises 
can	only	become	active	if	the	»narrow	subsidiarity	clause«	is	fulfilled,	i.e.	the	
public	 purpose	 in	 question	 cannot	 be	 fulfilled	more	 effectively	 by	 private	
suppliers.	 In	 others,	 the	 »simple	 subsidiarity	 clause«	 states	 that	 proof	 of	
performance	parity	between	public	and	private	companies	is	sufficient.	The	
narrow subsidiarity clause can be found in federal states such as Bavaria, the 
Rhineland-Palatinate and Thuringia; the simple subsidiarity clause is exercised 
in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-
Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein. In practice, both the narrow and the simple 
subsidiarity clauses leave scope for interpretation because deciding whether 
a	private	company	or	a	public	enterprise	is	better	at	fulfilling	a	public	purpose	
turns	out	 to	be	difficult.	Finally,	 the	»local	activity«	criterion	 is	designed	 to	
exclusively restrict the decision-making competence of a local authority (and 
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hence also its economic activity) to the local sphere. The snag is that the 
boundary of this sphere of responsibility is not always precisely defined.
In political practice, it ultimately largely boils down to whether expanding 
local government economic activity violates the aforementioned legal 
conditions regarding the fulfillment of a »public purpose« and »restriction 
to local activity« (Henneke, 1994, p. 38f.). From a public finance perspective, 
emphasizing the »public purpose« implies the economic justification of 
governmental activity usually discussed within the theory of public goods. 
Moreover, reference to »local activity« contains a link to the theory of fiscal 
federalism with its focus on the spatial range of the provision of public goods.
3 Considerations from a public goods perspective
Under a free-market system the private sector is granted priority over 
government (and also municipal) economic activity. The reason for this is 
the assumed private sector’s generally higher efficiency when it comes to 
commercial activity compared to public sector (Hayek, 1937; Musgrave & 
Musgrave 1989; Bailey, 1995). These differences in efficiency are particularly 
important when the expansion of municipal economic activity is assessed.
3.1 Structurally related inefficiencies in local public economic 
activity
When municipal companies compete with private firms, there is, as far as 
competition is concerned, initially nothing wrong with local public economic 
activity. What is economically decisive is the extent. When municipal 
companies become larger, local governments tend to reduce their being 
exposed to market forces. In Germany, the chances of private companies are 
often relatively poor in those areas where local public companies are active, 
the latter being systematically advantaged over their private competitors 
(Fuest et al., 2002; Bardt & Fuest, 2007). This even goes so far, that private 
suppliers are sometimes completely barred from the market – for example 
in the supply of water and gas as well as in the areas of sewage disposal and 
rubbish collection, all of which are big earners for municipal companies. And 
wherever competition does exist, public suppliers are still privileged: local 
public companies frequently do not pay value added tax, cooperation income 
tax or the local business tax because they can declare their commercial activity 
to be a sovereign task.
Furthermore, efficient market results can only be expected if it can be ensured 
that the commercial risk (including bankruptcy) is completely internalized. Yet 
in the case of public companies there is a good chance that if it comes to the 
crunch, commercial risk will be »socialized« by the local public budget. With 
this bail-out mechanism in place, there is no pressure to calculate prices at 
full cost – meaning equivalent or similar products can be offered by municipal 
companies at much lower prices than their private competitors. Moreover, 
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the prospect of public refinancing also means that municipal companies enjoy 
higher credit-rating with private banks, including the chance of better lending 
terms. Other distortions of competition are to be expected if municipal 
companies have unjustified advantages owing to their close links to the public 
sector, for instance in the award of public contracts.
3.2 Local public economic activity as provision of public goods?
If the efficiency enhancing effect of markets is limited for municipal companies, 
market allocation looses much of its effectiveness. In overall economic terms, 
production will take place at unnecessarily high costs and with a mismatch 
concerning consumer preferences. Moreover, local public economic activity 
may even damage the interest of a local authority. If, for example, municipal 
companies can drive private competitors out of the market thank to unfair 
competitive advantages, this will have repercussions for the local authority’s 
tax revenue. More obvious of course are the burdens on municipal budgets 
whenever a municipal company’s »new business idea« fails to catch on, 
effecting the necessary staff lay-offs will be harder for the local authority 
concerned than for private companies, owing to the stricter labor legislation 
in force for the public sector in Germany.
But apart from such budgetary considerations, convincing reasons are 
required to justify local public economic activity in the first place. From a public 
finance viewpoint, (local) government activity is only regarded as legitimate 
if the market fails to provide the goods and services or if the results achieved 
on the market have to be augmented by the government in order to satisfy 
public needs (Musgrave & Musgrave 1989; Bailey, 1995). What is at stake 
here is the area of public good; accordingly, government units ought only to 
become active if the goods provided by private actors are inadequate (e.g. 
production costs are too high without matching costumers’ preferences) and, 
if moreover, government provision will bring about better results. However, 
it is vital to note that the necessity of the municipal provision of a good or 
service does not automatically entail its municipal production (Rosen, 1992). 
Instead, production can be left to private suppliers, even in the area of public 
goods. This is the case if the quantity and quality of supply are regulated by 
government standards. This distinction between »provision« and »production« 
has major consequences for the assessment of an expansive business policy 
on the part of municipal companies.
Against this background, local public economic activity can only be regarded 
as expedient if it involves a necessary item of public supply, and if equivalent 
private production is impossible. Regarding the new fields of economic 
activities under discussion in Germany for municipal companies, this will only 
apply in extremely few cases (if any at all). For example, economically speaking 
there is nothing wrong with utility services such as electricity, gas and water 
supply, sewage disposal and rubbish collection, or telecom services being 
organized largely privately, as long as governmental regulations are met 
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and the monitoring costs incurred are not disproportionately high. Therefore, 
local authorities should steer clear of expanding their own economic activity 
(»production« in the above sense) in these areas.
Completely unjustified in terms of public finance considerations are such new 
economic activities by local authorities as running hotels and restaurants, 
solariums and fingernail studios, travel agencies, tourism services (e.g. 
sunshade or bicycle hire, setting up and managing campsites) or even opening 
municipal food retail outlets (as it has happened in the last two decades in 
Germany). None of those activities have any of the characteristics of a public 
good, and so municipal activity in these areas has no economic legitimacy 
whatsoever. This is all the more the case since these activities are generally 
exclusively fiscally motivated. From a public finance viewpoint, the fiscal aim 
is merely a secondary rather than an original aim of public finance.
4 Considerations from a fiscal federalism viewpoint
From the angle of the theory of fiscal federalism, citing the provision of public 
goods as a criterion is by itself not enough to justify local public economic 
activities (Ter-Minassian, 1997; Oates, 1998; Wellisch, 2000). In addition, 
commercial activities also have to have the characteristics of local public 
goods (indicated by their spatial range of benefits and costs).
4.1 Retaining the principle of fiscal equivalence
The principle of fiscal equivalence is generally used to determine the spatial 
efficient character of public activity (Olson, 1969; Döring & Voigt, 2006). This 
principle states that if the benefits of public services are subject of variation 
depending on the spatial heterogeneity of citizens’ preferences, an efficient 
supply of public goods can only be expected if the administrative responsibility 
for the provision of these goods is geared to the (geographical) circle of 
beneficiaries who also have to finance them. The focus to the beneficiaries 
tailors the supply to people’s preferences. Since those benefiting from public 
goods are the same as those bearing the production costs of them, this should 
ensure that the cost of the supply is minimized. In this way, the scope of public 
supply and the related public expenditure are subject to the decision-making 
powers of the citizens concerned.
Given this, cases in which municipal commercial activities extend beyond the 
local sphere of influence may be regarded as problematic. Particular attention 
is drawn to local energy utilities, which in addition to satisfying local demand 
also meet demand in other areas by taking over other councils’ utilities. A 
similar situation exists in the case of local authority transport companies. 
From the angle of fiscal federalism, there is also the danger that during the 
course of such company take-overs, a spatial disparity may emerge between 
the beneficiaries and the cost bearers of public services. For example, if 
such a local concentration of supply leads to the effect that previous price 
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differences, caused by the specifics of local demand, are evened out, the 
economically desirable allocation of costs among the public depending 
on those responsible for them might no longer be ensured. Moreover, the 
advantages of the decentralized provision local government services (i.e. 
taking local citizens’ preferences better into account) will be abandoned 
without reason.
Furthermore, the theory of fiscal federalism provides an additional perspective 
for the assessment of the purely fiscally motivated expansion of local public 
economic activity. The advocates of an expansion strategy often cite the fact 
that ensuring local government self-administration enshrined in the German 
constitution also requires a minimum of public financial autonomy, and state 
that since this autonomy cannot be guaranteed by the existing sources of 
finance (taxes and transfers), local authorities must have the option of earning 
the missing funds by building up their economic activities (Otting, 1997b). 
From the viewpoint of the principle of fiscal equivalence, however, the 
argument veers off in the wrong direction. The financing of local government 
functions from revenue which is not immediately related to these functions 
lacks an incentive structure in the sense of fiscal equivalence: Citizens should 
be able to weigh the benefits of additional local public services against the 
resulting fiscal burdens. And if the additional expenditure of a local authority 
is financed by the profits earned by its companies in business transactions 
with citizens from other local authorities, this results in an externalization 
of fiscal burdens – which from the public finance perspective ought to be 
avoided (Feld & Kirchgässner, 2000).
4.2 Achieving economies of scale in production
The principle of fiscal equivalence chiefly takes the demand-side characteristics 
of public goods – in this case the citizens’ locally varying preferences – into 
consideration. However, the spatially efficient provision of public goods is 
also determined by supply-side characteristics (Fisher, 1996, p. 126ff). A key 
role in this respect is played by achieving economies of scale in production 
(i.e. falling unit costs owing to an increase in supply quantity). Clearly this 
argument bears a strong relation to especially the expansion of municipal 
economic activity, because it might achieve such economies of scale. Putting 
this argument forward, the greater usage of already existing production 
structures enables at the same time the deviation form a strict interpretation 
of the local sphere of activity of local government companies.
Instead, especially for cost-intensive aspects of providing public supply (e.g. 
waste disposal services), voluntary cooperation between local authorities 
(for instance by setting up a special purpose association) is a way of letting 
economies of scale work and of thus making supply less costly (Frey & 
Eichenberger, 1999). Hence for reasons of cost efficiency, the catchment 
area supplied by a municipal company need not necessarily conform to 
the local authority’s geographical boundary. This could even include cases 
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in which products developed by a local authority that are of interest to other 
local authorities (e.g. the development of software services tailored to local 
government needs) could be marketed regionally. This would have the twin 
benefits of increasing the product’s economic viability for the local authority 
developing it and of saving development costs for the other local authorities.
In this argument of the better utilization of existing production capacities 
which would otherwise go unused, the duration of the underutilization 
of the capacities should also play a role. If this situation is only temporary, 
expanding local government economic activity to ensure the full utilization of 
capacity may be justified. However, in the case of permanent underutilization 
the reduction of existing capacities would be the only justifiable solution. 
Seen from this angle, production structures not used to full capacity in the 
long term are nothing more than a symptom of bad public planning which 
needs to be corrected. An example for such bad planning at the level of local 
government is the waste incineration capacities built up in a whole series of 
German towns and cities in the last two decades, which are far too large and 
for this reason are the target of considerable political criticism.
4.3 Significance for competition between local authorities
Under the theory of fiscal federalism the question can also be raised whether 
the extent to which an expansion of local public economic activities can help 
intensify or on the other hand may even impair processes of competition 
between local authorities. The idea of competition between local authorities 
is based on the assumption that local authorities compete with each other to 
attract people and enterprise through their services and through the level of 
taxes they impose. Similar to the competition on private markets, it is assumed 
that in the long run those local government products will best attract among 
the public which are inexpensive and which match people’s preferences best 
(Tiebout, 1956; Gerken, 1995; with focus on local government enterprises, 
Friedrich & Feng, 2000). With regard to the (spatial) expansion of local public 
economic activity, the perspective of competition between local authorities 
provides justification, though within limits. This concerns above all those 
economic activities in which the competitors are mainly those municipal 
companies that belong to other town councils. For instance, the possibility 
of regional marketing of municipal data-processing services may result in 
one local authority increasing its efforts to develop a range of services better 
suited to its own needs. It may also result in a local authority simply using 
the (better) services of another in order to save the high development costs 
which would otherwise be picked up by its citizens.
Against this background, the possibility of one municipal company being 
taken over by one which belongs to a different local authority initially seems 
positive. In Germany, in the last two decades such take-overs especially took 
place in the areas of electricity and water supply as well as garbage collection. 
However, it is not so much the take-over as such as the option thereof which 
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could generate more competition between municipal companies, resulting 
in the improved efficiency of the goods and services they supply. Then 
again, should such a hostile take-over actually take place, this will heighten 
the danger of supply becoming dominated by just a handful of municipal 
companies. The consequence would doubtlessly be a major reduction of 
competition between local authorities. The same situation would arise if a 
municipal company – say an energy utility – took the pick of the bunch by 
attracting large individual costumers from neighboring authorities. The 
utility’s higher revenue would then be earned at the expense of a utility in 
another local authority, which would have lost large profitable customers 
but would still be responsible for meeting the needs of less lucrative small 
costumers. Rather than being advantageous for all local authorities, this form 
of spatial expansion of municipal economic activity would instead result in 
some local authorities gaining, while others significantly lose out.
5 Some political economy considerations
The so far overwhelmingly negative appraisal of the expansion of local 
public economic activity is backed up when considering the subject from the 
perspective of new political economy (Mueller, 1989; Johnson, 1991; Stevens 
1993; regarding public enterprises, see Wiseman, 1978). From this view, 
municipal economic activity not only needs to be limited to the local sphere of 
activity, but also – and more importantly – (local) government activity needs 
to take second place to private-sector activities.
Justifying the expansion of local public economic activity – be it by the 
extensive interpretation of public aims (»securing jobs«, »promoting the 
local economic structure«, etc.) – or by reference to the »fundamental 
comprehensive jurisdiction of government and thus the sovereignty of the 
democratic legislator« (Otting, 1997b, p. 146 – own translation) – ignores 
from the political economy viewpoint the principal-agent problem of 
government activity which always exists in democratic systems based on 
public representation such as in Germany. Against this background, a narrow 
interpretation of the pursuit of public aims or even the demand that private 
sector activity take precedence over the public sector and would not restrict 
the sovereignty of (local) government but rather the discretionary room for 
maneuvers of bureaucrats and politicians, who do not (only) work for the 
general interest but also follow their own objectives (Furubotn & Richter, 
1998).
Another factor arguing against the expansion of local public economic 
activity is that »managers in public companies – owing to their bureaucratic 
organization – pay less attention to the owners’ advantages than do managers 
working in the private sector« (Schneider, 1998, p. 12 – own translation). 
Furthermore, the incentive situation in public companies is comparable with 
that in public administrations (Niskanen, 1994). Since monetary incentives are 
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largely lacking owing to rigid bureaucratic norms, public managers use their 
freedom of action not to boost production efficiency but rather to satisfy their 
own personal ambitions such as prestige or power (for example through a 
non-sanctioned strategy of maximizing turnover or increasing the number of 
employees). This theoretical view is confirmed by empirical studies revealing 
»significant differences in behavior between public and private managers« 
(Andersen, 2010, p. 131).
Ultimately, the political economy viewpoint also enables to assess the 
purely fiscal motive behind the expansion of local public economic activity. 
For this case, it also holds from this angle that a local authority’s fiscal need 
should ideally be covered by (local) taxes, because only in this way can the 
government activity be tied to the public will. Although it is stipulated in 
the municipal ordinances in Germany that municipal tasks should primarily 
be financed using fees and charges before taxes, it cannot be inversely 
concluded that local public economic activity should be expanded simply 
because the goods and services offered by municipal companies are financed 
by fees and charges or market-like prices. The regional externalization of 
fiscal burdens (described above) is not the only danger; in addition, given the 
very low perceptibility of the existing financing system of local government 
in Germany (high proportion of federal transfers, low visibility of the income 
and turnover tax shares allocates to local government), the desirable link 
between the local government revenue and local public expenditure hardly 
exists (simply for reasons of political control). Covering the municipal fiscal 
need by means of commercial activity additionally confuse the already murky 
nature of the financing system of local councils.
6 Conclusion
As a result of the assessment from various theoretical angles the economic 
activities of local authorities appear to be admissible at best to a very limited 
degree. The type of business would have to be restricted to those with a 
strong public good content. This rules out such new economic activities by 
local government as running hotels, restaurants, solariums, travel agencies, 
catering services, flowers shops, car washes or even opening municipal food 
retail outlets, all of which may lead to a crowding out of private suppliers. 
Tapping new sources of revenue through economic activities as an end of 
itself is merely no original aim of local public finance.
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Povzetek
GOSPODARSKE DEJAVNOSTI NEMŠKIH LOKALNIH 
OBLASTI: KRITIČNE OPOMBE S STALIŠČA JAVNIH 
FINANC
Ključne besede:  lokalne javne finance, gospodarska ponudba lokalne uprave, 
podjetja v lasti lokalne uprave, fiskalni federalizem, nova politična 
ekonomija
V času proračunskih primanjkljajev – kar je izkusila večina lokalnih oblasti v 
zadnjih dvajsetih letih – se vedno pogosteje pojavljajo nove poslovne ideje, 
kako bi ustvarili več prihodkov. Mestni sveti se ne ustavljajo več zgolj pri 
oskrbovanju z električno energijo, plinom ali pri pobiranju smeti – vse to 
so tradicionalne lokalne dejavnosti javne uprave. Začeli so namreč ponujati 
različne druge proizvode in storitve podjetij, ki so v javni lasti. Te gospodarske 
dejavnosti so na primer prevoz, informacijska tehnologija in telekomunikacijske 
storitve. Nekatere lokalne oblasti imajo v lasti gramoznice, kamnolome in 
vinograde. Spet druge se ukvarjajo z gostinskimi storitvami, s cvetličarnami, 
upravljajo restavracije in hotele, potovalne agencije, energetske svetovalnice, 
kozmetične salone in celo avtopralnice. Drugi mestni sveti pa vozijo svoja 
zasebna vozila v popravilo k svojim lokalnim centrom za prevozne storitve.
Omenjeni primeri zmanjševanja proračunskega primanjkljaja z uvedbo novih 
gospodarskih dejavnosti nemških lokalnih oblasti nikakor niso redki; pravzaprav 
so v zadnjih dveh desetletjih lokalne oblasti po vsej Nemčiji povečevale svoje 
podjetniške dejavnosti bolj kot kdajkoli prej. V letu 2010 je 5,3 % prihodkov 
lokalnih skupnosti v Zahodni Nemčiji izhajalo iz lastnih poslovnih dejavnosti, 
kar pomeni dvig iz 4,7 % iz leta 1992; v Vzhodni Nemčiji se je v istem obdobju 
delež povečal s 4,3 % na 5,1 %. Tukaj so upoštevani prodaja električne energije, 
plina, vode ter kmetijskih in gozdarskih proizvodov, najem in zakup ter dobički 
iz gospodarskih podjetij in lastniški deleži družb, kakor tudi davki na licenčnine 
in koncesijske dajatve. V celoti so prihodki iz gospodarskih dejavnosti v letu 
2010 prispevali v lokalni državni proračun skoraj 9,3 milijarde €, kar je 55 
odstotna porast v primerjavi s 6,0 milijardami € v letu 1992.
Za takšno trgovinsko širitev obstaja veliko razlogov, pri čemer je eden od njih 
spremenjeno gospodarsko okolje. Na primer, konkurenčna politika Evropske 
Unije zadnjih dveh desetletij je povzročila, da se tradicionalna (običajno 
monopolna) področja poslovanja javnih komunalnih podjetij v Nemčiji vedno 
bolj srečujejo z zasebno konkurenco. Ker prihodki na teh področjih upadajo, 
poskuša lokalna uprava izpad prihodka kompenzirati z uvajanjem novih 
področij poslovanja. Ta dodatni vir zaslužka za lokalne javne proračune naj 
bi posredno pomagal lokalnih svetom pri izpolnjevanju njihovih obveznosti. 
Naraščajoča trgovinska dejavnost naj bi tudi zaščitila delovna mesta v javni 
upravi, ki so ogrožena zaradi upadanja prihodkov iz prodaje obstoječih 
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storitev javnih komunalnih podjetij. Kljub temu je ta strategija razširitve 
naletela na ostre kritike, njen gospodarski vpliv pa je postal predmet živahne 
razprave v Nemčiji. Gospodarske dejavnosti lokalne samouprave pa večinoma 
obsojajo tudi zasebna podjetja in poslovna združenja, ki kritizirajo neenake 
pogoje konkurence med zasebnimi in lokalnimi javnimi podjetji in ki trdijo, da 
bi gospodarske dejavnosti lokalnih oblasti morale biti omejene.
Tukaj bi morali upoštevati predvsem pravne omejitve lokalnih javnih 
gospodarskih dejavnosti v Nemčiji. Načeloma nemška ustava ne prepoveduje 
širitve lokalnih javnih gospodarskih dejavnosti, vendar pa regionalni zakoni 
(kot so jih sprejele nemške zvezne dežele) urejajo zakonitost teh dejavnosti 
v poglavjih, ki urejajo lokalno institucionalni okvir (tako imenovani občinski 
odloki). Čeprav se ti nekoliko razlikujejo med posameznimi nemškimi deželami, 
so v večini od njih gospodarske dejavnosti lokalnih oblasti dovoljene, če: 
(1) je dejavnost utemeljena z javnim namenom; (2) vrsta in obseg dejavnosti 
ustrezata finančni sposobnosti lokalne oblasti in predvideni potrebi za javno 
službo; (3) zasebni sektor ne more več ali vsaj enako učinkovito izpolnjevati 
namena (tako imenovana subsidiarna klavzula); (4) se lahko lokalna oblast loti 
gospodarskih dejavnosti zgolj na lokalni ravni. V politični praksi le-ta v veliki 
meri na koncu na kratko povzema, ali naraščajoča lokalna vladna gospodarska 
dejavnost krši zgoraj omenjene zakonske pogoje v zvezi z izpolnjevanjem 
»javnega namena« in »omejitve na lokalno dejavnost«. Z vidika javnega 
financiranja poudarjanje »javnega namena« pomeni ekonomsko upravičenost 
vladne dejavnosti, ki je običajno predmet razprave v teoriji javnih dobrin. 
Poleg tega sklicevanje na »lokalno dejavnost« vsebuje povezavo na teorijo 
fiskalnega federalizma s poudarkom na prostorskem obsegu zagotavljanja 
javnih dobrin.
Z gospodarskega vidika ima prosti trg zasebnega sektorja prednost pred 
državno (in tudi komunalno) gospodarsko dejavnostjo. Vzrok za to je domnev-
na splošno večja učinkovitost zasebnega sektorja, ko gre za gospodarsko 
dejavnost v primerjavi z javnim sektorjem. Te razlike v učinkovitosti so še zlasti 
pomembne pri odločanju o širitvi občinske gospodarske dejavnosti. Lokalna 
dejavnost velja kot pravno upravičena, če trg ne zagotavlja blaga in storitev, 
ali če mora vlada, da bi zadovoljila javne potrebe, povečati ponudbo. Pri tem 
je odločujoče področje javnega dobra; zato bi lokalne enote morale postati 
aktivne zgolj, če so dobrine, ki jih zagotavljajo zasebni akterji, nezadostne 
(npr. proizvodni stroški so previsoki in ne ustrezajo preferencam strank) in če 
poleg tega lokalna oskrba omogoča doseganje boljših rezultatov. Kljub temu 
pa je pomembno opozoriti, da nujnost komunalnega zagotavljanja dobrin ali 
storitev samodejno ne sproža tudi komunalne proizvodnje. Namesto tega 
je proizvodnjo mogoče prepustiti zasebnim dobaviteljem tudi na področju 
javnih dobrin.
Na podlagi tega se lokalna javna gospodarska dejavnost lahko šteje za primerno 
samo, če vključuje nujno potrebni element javne ponudbe in enakovredna 
zasebna proizvodnja ni mogoča. Glede novih področij gospodarskih dejavnosti, 
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ki so predmet razprave v Nemčiji, naj bi to za komunalna podjetja veljalo samo 
v izjemno redkih primerih (če sploh). Na primer, ekonomsko gledano ni nič 
narobe s komunalnimi storitvami, kot so na primer električna energija, plin in 
oskrba z vodo, odstranjevanje odplak in smeti ter telekomunikacijske storitve, 
ki se v veliki meri organizirajo na zasebni ravni, dokler so državni predpisi 
izpolnjeni in nastali nadzorni stroški niso nesorazmerno visoki. Zato se morajo 
lokalne oblasti izogibati širitvi svoje gospodarske dejavnosti (proizvodnja 
v prej omenjenem smislu) na teh področjih. Takšne nove gospodarske 
dejavnosti lokalnih oblasti kot je na primer vodenje hotelov in restavracij, 
solarijev in kozmetičnih salonov, potovalnih agencij, turističnih storitev (na 
primer izposoja senčnikov in koles, postavitev in upravljanje kampov) ali celo 
odpiranje maloprodajnih mest za prehrano (kot se je vse to zgodilo v zadnjih 
dveh desetletjih v Nemčiji) so popolnoma neupravičene z vidika javnih financ. 
Nobena od teh dejavnosti nima značilnosti javne dobrine, zato komunalna 
dejavnost na teh območjih nima nikakršne gospodarske upravičenosti.
Z vidika teorije fiskalnega federalizma sklicevanje na zagotavljanje javnih 
dobrin kot kriterija samo po sebi ni dovolj, da bi opravičilo lokalne javne 
gospodarske dejavnosti. Poleg tega morajo imeti komercialne dejavnosti tudi 
značilnosti lokalnih javnih dobrin (katere označuje njihov prostorski obseg 
koristi in stroškov). Načelo davčne enakovrednosti se običajno uporablja za 
določitev prostorsko učinkovitega značaja javne dejavnosti. To načelo določa, 
da če so koristi javnih storitev predmet spreminjanja v odvisnosti od prostorske 
heterogenosti preferenc državljanov, je učinkovito oskrbo z javnimi dobrinami 
mogoče pričakovati le, če je upravna odgovornost za zagotavljanje teh dobrin 
usmerjena h (geografskemu) krogu upravičencev, ki jih je tudi treba financirati. 
Glede na to so lahko primeri, v katerih se komunalne komercialne dejavnosti 
razširjajo zunaj lokalne sfere vpliva, problematični. Posebna pozornost je 
namenjena lokalnim javnim energetskim službam, ki poleg zadovoljevanja 
lokalnih povpraševanj prav tako izpolnjujejo povpraševanje na drugih 
področjih s prevzemanjem javnih energetskih služb drugih okolij. Podobna 
situacija obstaja glede prevoznih podjetij lokalnih oblasti. Z vidika davčnega 
federalizma obstaja tudi nevarnost, da se med prevzemom takšnega podjetja 
lahko pojavi prostorska neskladnost med upravičenci in nosilci stroškov javnih 
storitev. Poleg tega pa financiranju lokalnih vladnih funkcij iz prihodkov, ki 
niso neposredno povezana s temi funkcijami, primanjkuje spodbuda v smislu 
fiskalne enakovrednosti: državljani bi morali biti sposobni pretehtati prednosti 
dodatnih lokalnih javnih storitev v primerjavi z davki, ki iz tega izhajajo. Če se 
dodatni stroški lokalne oblasti financirajo iz dobičkov, ki so jih ustvarila njihova 
podjetja v poslovnih transakcijah z državljani iz drugih lokalnih skupnosti, je 
posledica tega eksternalizacija davčne obremenitve – kateri bi se z bilo vidika 
javnih financ treba izogniti.
Doslej pretežno negativna ocena razširitve lokalne javne gospodarske 
dejavnosti se lahko spremeni, če obravnavamo vprašanje z vidika nove 
politične ekonomije. S tega vidika komunalno gospodarsko dejavnost ni 
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treba omejiti samo na lokalno področje delovanja, temveč mora tudi lokalna 
dejavnost zavzeti drugačno mesto glede na dejavnosti zasebnega sektorja, 
kar je še pomembneje. Opravičevanje širitve lokalne javne gospodarske 
dejavnosti – na primer z obširno razlago javnih ciljev (»zagotavljanje delovnih 
mest«, »spodbujanje lokalne gospodarske strukture«, itd.) – s politično 
ekonomskega vidika ne upošteva problema spodbujanja državne dejavnosti, 
ki vedno obstaja v demokratičnih sistemih kot na primer v Nemčiji. Zato ozka 
razlaga zasledovanja javnih ciljev ali celo zahteve, da ima dejavnost zasebnega 
sektorja prednost pred javnim sektorjem, ne omejuje suverenosti (lokalne) 
oblasti, temveč omogoča diskrecijski prostor za manevre birokratov in 
politikov, ki ne delujejo (zgolj) zaradi splošnega interesa, temveč sledijo tudi 
lastnim ciljem.
Še en dejavnik nasprotuje širitvi lokalne javne gospodarske dejavnosti, 
namreč da menedžerji v javnih podjetjih – zaradi birokratske organiziranosti 
javnega sektorja – navadno posvečajo manj pozornosti koristim lastnikov kot 
menedžerji, ki delajo v zasebnem sektorju. Poleg tega pa se spodbude v javnih 
podjetjih lahko primerljajo s tistimi v javni upravi: ker togi birokratski predpisi 
precej omejujejo denarne spodbude, menedžerji v javni upravi ne uveljavljajo 
svobode delovanja zato, da bi povečali proizvodno učinkovitost, temveč zato, 
da bi zadovoljili svoje lastne ambicije, kot sta na primer prestiž in moč (na 
primer da bi z uvedbo nesankcionirane strategije čim bolj povečali prihodke 
od prodaje ali povečali število zaposlenih).
Po presoji z različnih zornih teoretičnih kotov se zdi, da so gospodarske 
dejavnosti lokalnih oblasti dopustne kvečjemu v zelo omejenem obsegu. Vrsta 
posla bi morala biti omejena na tiste dejavnosti, ki imajo velik delež javnega 
dobra. To izključuje večino novih gospodarskih dejavnosti lokalnih oblasti, ki 
lahko povzročajo izpodrivanje zasebnih ponudnikov. Poleg tega pa odpiranje 
novih virov prihodkov z uvajanjem novih gospodarskih dejavnosti nikakor ne 
more biti osnovni cilj lokalnih javnih financ.
